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Quisano v. State, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 9 (February 18, 2016)1 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: DUTY TO DISCLOSE 
Summary 
 This court affirmed an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to an Alford2 plea, 
of voluntary manslaughter and child abuse, neglect, or endangerment with substantial bodily harm 
holding: 
(1) Brady violations do not occur when the evidence in question is not favorable to the 
defendant; 
(2) Prosecutors have a strict duty to disclose under their own open-file policy until 
sentencing proceedings; and, 
(3) Media outlets require a written by the district court to electronically cover proceedings 
unless nonconstitutional or harmless error results in such coverage. 
Background 
 On June 6, 2013, under appellant Jonathan Quisano’s sole supervision, Khayden Quisano 
(Quisano and his longtime girlfriend Christina Rodrigues’s three-year-old child) died as a result 
of injuries associated with blunt-force trauma to the head. Quisano maintained that Khayden fell 
off a couch and hit his head on tile floor; however, Quisano provided conflicting accounts of the 
circumstances, as did medical experts. Quisano had a documented history of child abuse and 
neglect–one his children already died and Khayden had suffered a broken leg and ribs from 
nonaccidental trauma his death. 
On June 25, 2014, before his trial, Quisano pled guilty pursuant to Alford, to voluntary 
manslaughter and child abuse, neglect, or endangerment with substantial bodily harm. The State 
retained the right to argue and agreed not to argue a minimum sentence exceeding ten years. After 
entry of Quisano’s guilty plea, but before sentencing, the State obtained an affidavit relevant to 
Quisano’s case but did not disclose the affidavit to Quisano. The affidavit was from Clark County 
Department of Family Services (DFS), dated September 4, 2014, and swore that Christina 
Rodrigues said Khayden died as a result of physical abuse by Quisano, that he should be punished, 
and should go to prison.  
On October 7, 2014 Quisano was sentenced. Christina Rodrigues provided a favorable oral 
statement to the court on Quisano’s behalf, under the guise of a victim-impact statement–that 
Quisano was kind, loving, caring, responsible, and everyday showed love and affection, and 
sending him to prison will harm more than help. The State then used the affidavit to impeach 
Christina Rodrigues. The district court sustained Quisano’s objections regarding the affidavit 
noting that the affidavit discussed testimony before another forum. Quisano then argued that the 
                                                          
1  By Michael Hua 
2  See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) 
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State failed to disclose the affidavit and requested the district court to designate the affidavit as an 
exhibit for the record. The district court did.  
Nonetheless, although the district court had concerns about the conflicting medical 
evidence, Quisano’s prior record of child abuse convinced the district court to sentence Quisano 
to serve a prison term of 4-10 years for voluntary manslaughter and a consecutive prison term of 
6-19 years for child abuse, neglect, or endangerment with substantial bodily harm.  
At sentencing, the district court permitted the Las Vegas Review Journal (LVRJ) to provide 
electronic coverage even though the media outlet did not timely file a request for permission. The 
district court reasoned that permitting the outlet to provide electronic coverage of the proceeding 
would facilitate public oversight over the judicial process. Generally, the district court grants all 
requests to provide electronic coverage and would have granted the request had the LVRJ filed 
one. The district court saw no prejudice in allowing the reporter record the proceeding.  
Discussion 
1. Quisano’s Brady3 argument failed because the affidavit was not favorable to him. 
Quisano argued the State withheld impeachment evidence in violation of Brady by failing to 
disclose the affidavit. On the other hand, the State argued that the affidavit was neither favorable 
nor useful to impeach at trial.  
A defendant must prove the following three elements to establish a Brady violation: (1) the 
State withheld or failed to disclose evidence, (2) that was favorable to the defense, and (3) 
prejudice.4 Favorable evidence includes evidence that “provides grounds for the defense to attack 
the reliability, thoroughness, and good faith of police investigation, to impeach the credibility of 
the state’s witnesses, or to bolster the defense case against prosecutorial attacks.”5 
In the affidavit, a DFS employee swore Rodrigues acknowledged that Quisano was responsible 
for death of their son and that Quisano should be imprisoned. There was no prejudice because the 
disclosure of the affidavit would not have provided Quisano with a basis to attack police 
investigation, impeach the State’s witnesses, or bolster his case against prosecutorial attacks. 
Moreover, the affidavit was not exculpatory.6  
Because the affidavit was not favorable, Quisano’s Brady argument fails and this Court found 
no need to consider the remaining factors. 
  
                                                          
3  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  
4  Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 67, 993 P.2d 25, 36 (2000). 
5  Id. 
6  King v. State, 116 Nev. 349, 359, 998 P.2d 1172, 1178 (2000) (defining exculpatory evidence “as evidence that 
will explain away the charge”). 
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2. The State’s failure to disclose the affidavit, under an open-file policy, did not 
prejudice Quisano and therefore, did not warrant a new sentencing hearing. 
Quisano argued that the State’s open-file policy subjected the State to a duty to disclose all 
evidence in its possession; and that the State’s failure to comply to the duty unfairly surprised and 
prejudiced him so he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing.  
This court concluded the State’s discovery policy on each Receipt of Copy constituted an open-
file policy under ordinary contract principles.7 Under McKee v. State8, a prosecutor’s open-file 
policy created a duty to disclose all inculpatory or exculpatory evidence when the defendant 
reasonably relied on the that policy. The State argued that McKee does not extend through 
sentencing.  
Nonetheless, this court looked to a capital case, Floyd v. State,9 and how it applied discovery 
statutes10 to both guilt and penalty phase. The phrase “case in chief” as used in the discovery 
statutes included both guilt and penalty phase.11 Therefore, duty to disclose evidence remains until 
proceedings fully conclude in trial court. Further, the State routinely discloses discovery that is 
inculpatory in nature in cases involving enhanced penalties like DUI, domestic violence, and 
habituality. Defendants must also have an opportunity to review materials prior sentencing because 
this opportunity enhances judicial efficiency by avoiding delays caused by surprise evidence.12 
The State’s failure to disclose may impact a sentence so a defendant’s reliance on an open-file 
policy following a plea or jury verdict continues until sentencing concludes.13 Thus, the duty to 
disclose under McKee applies to trial and sentencing in a noncapital case. When the State agrees 
to disclose all evidence in possession, the defendant may reasonably rely on that promise.14  
A defendant may reasonably rely on an open-file policy beyond guilty plea when the policy 
explicitly provides that this invitation is ongoing and does not state the policy concludes upon 
entering guilty plea. Therefore, a defendant would reasonably expect disclosure continues until 
final judgment. Thus, for reasons stated, the duty to disclose in McKee extends through entry of 
judgment of conviction.  
In Quisano’s case, the State had an open-file policy subject to ongoing duty to disclose all 
evidence in its possession, repeated references to that policy, and regular discovery disclosures. 
So Quisano could reasonably rely, under the State’s open-file policy, on the State’s promise to 
                                                          
7  State v. Crockett, 110 Nev. 838, 842, 877 P.2d 1077, 1, 079 (194) (explaining that plea agreements are subject to 
contract principles); McKee v. State, 112 Nev. 642, 647-48, 917 P.2d 940, 943-44 (1996) (open-file policy created 
expectation that prosecutor would disclose all available evidence–whether inculpatory or exculpatory; failure to 
disclose an inculpating photograph was misconduct).  
8  Id. 
9  118 Nev. 110, 178 P.3d 154 (2008). 
10  NEV. REV. STAT. 174.234 and NEV. REV. STAT. 174.245. Id. at 167, 42 P.3d at 257. 
11  Id. 
12  See NEV. REV. STAT. 169.035 (statutes shall be “construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in 
administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.” 
13  See Miller v. Hayes, 95 Nev. 927, 929, 6504 P.2d 117, 118 (1979) (holding the district court’s jurisdiction over 
the defendant continues until the judgment becomes final). 
14  McKee, 112 Nev. At 648, 917 P.2d at 944.  
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provide discovery as it becomes available. Yet, the State failed to disclose the affidavit to Quisano 
prior to its use at Quisano’s sentencing hearing and therefore engaged in misconduct.15 
This court was mindful that high case volumes and differing case management systems may 
cause a prosecutor’s failure to provide discovery and such failure may be unintentional rather than 
willful or intentional. Thus, district courts must make factual findings whether violations are 
inadvertent, willful, or intentional. Without finding willfulness or intent, courts should not classify 
unintentional violation as prosecutorial misconduct.  
Nevertheless, the affidavit did not prejudice Quisano. 
(1) The district court sustained Quisano’s objection after the State asserted to Rodrigues “you 
went to court one time and asked for one thing, and you’re coming to curt now and asking 
for the complete opposite”; 
(2)  The State relied on Quisano’s prior record of child abuse and not the State’s impeachment 
of Rodrigues; 
(3) The district court did not place value on the affidavit, only marked the affidavit as a court 
exhibit, and expressed Quisano’s history of child abuse in Hawaii was particularly 
influential in its sentencing determination; 
(4) Most importantly, the district court sentenced Quisano according to the guilty plea 
agreement. 
Thus, although the failure to disclose the affidavit violated the State’s open-file policy, there 
was no prejudice or miscarriage of justice.16 Therefore, reversal of Quisano’s sentence was not 
warranted on this issue.  
3. The district court’s err to permit the Las Vegas Review Journal to record Quisano’s 
sentencing hearing did not contribute to the district court’s sentencing determination 
and Quisano was not entitled to relief on this basis.  
Quisano argued that this court remand because the district court erred in permitting the LVRJ 
to record the hearing without timely request for permission, written order, or make particularized 
findings. The State argued no err because courts grant untimely requests and do not need to make 
explicit findings regarding SCR 230(2) on the record.  
A district court’s failure to follow procedural requirements in allowing electronic coverage 
result in err when resulting in nonconstitutional and harmless error.17 The error must have 
substantially influence the sentencing determination or injure the defendant’s sentence.18  
                                                          
15  See McKee, 112 Nev. At 648, 917 P.2d at 944 (concluding that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by failing 
to comply with an open-file policy.) 
16  Valdez v State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465, 447 (reversal is not warranted under plain-error standard 
unless error affects defendant’s substantial rights). 
17  See NEV. REV. STAT. 178.598 (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded.”). 
18  See Knipes v. State, 124 Nev. 927, 935, 192 P.3d 1178, 1183 (2008) (concluding that failure to apply the 
procedural safeguards for juror questioning constitutes nonconstitutional error and applying the federal test set forth 
in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946)). 
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The United States Supreme Court has not created a per se constitutional rule against electronic 
coverage of court room proceedings.19 However, technological advancements have limited the 
disruption of cameras and states have safeguarded against the worries of earlier case law.20  
In Nevada, under SCR 230(2), public proceedings are presumptively subject to electronic 
coverage. Under SCR 240(1), participants in courtroom proceedings need not consent to electronic 
coverage. Under SCR 230(1), media outlets must file a written request at least 24 hours before 
electronic coverage of the proceeding, but the district court may grant requests to provide 
electronic coverage on shorter notice or waive the requirement for written request. “A judge shall 
make particularized findings on the record when determining whether electronic coverage will be 
allowed.”21 The written order must be made part of the record.22 
For Quisano, the district court permitted the LVRJ to provide electronic coverage of the 
sentencing hearing despite the LVRJ’s failure to timely file a request for permission–such 
determination was expressly authorized by SCR 230(1). However, the district court failed to make 
particularized findings on the record based on the factors in SCR 230(2), such as potential 
prejudice, public benefit, and physical adequacy of the courtroom, when it did not issue a written 
order granting the outlet’s request.  
The district court erred in complying with the requirements, but such error was harmless. The 
record did not suggest the error contributed to sentencing determination and Quisano 
acknowledged that the presence of the camera did not prejudice him. This court also agreed with 
the district court that electronic coverage provides potential benefit to the public.23 Therefore, this 
court found that Quisano’s argument failed.  
                                                          
19  Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 573, 582-83 (1981). 
20  Id at 576-77. 
21  SCR 230(2): (a) the impact of coverage upon the right of any party; (b) the impact of coverage upon right of 
privacy on any party or witness; (c) impact of coverage upon safety and well-being of any party, witness, or juror; 
(d) the likelihood that coverage would distract or detract participants from dignity of proceedings; (e) the adequacy 
of physical facilities of the court for coverage; and (f) any other factor affecting fairness. 
22  SCR 230(1). 
23  Such as (1) access to and knowledge of the justice system; (2) public oversight of the judicial process; (3) 
increased awareness to societal problems; and, (4) protection of defendant’s rights. 
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Conclusion 
(1) The prosecutor’s failure to disclose the affidavit did not violate Brady because the 
affidavit was not favorable to Quisano; 
(2) Even though the prosecutor failed to disclose the affidavit regarding the State’s open-
file policy, the misconduct did not prejudice Quisano because the district court did not 
rely on the affidavit in sentencing Quisano according to the guilty plea; 
(3) Even though the district court failed to write an order on the particularized findings on 
the record regarding the factors in SCR 230(2) or to grant permission for the Las Vegas 
Review- Journal to provide electronic coverage of the sentencing hearing, any error 
was harmless because it did not contribute to the sentencing determination.  
Affirmed. 
Concurrence–Dissent 
 Agreed with most things except the open-file policy. The majority wrongly reasons that 
because several statutes24 require the State to provide certain types of discovery in connection with 
certain types of sentencing proceedings, that the State’s open-file policy should require the same 
disclosure in cases not covered by those statutes. Just because the legislature governs some 
discovery obligations does not mean the obligations govern prosecutors in cases the Legislature 
chose not to address. If anything, legislative intent did not create a general rule of discovery 
governing all criminal cases. The judiciary should not have the power to interpret the prosecutorial 
policy the way the majority had.  
 As an intermediate appellate court, this Court is bound by stare decisis and should not 
consider issues raised for first time on appeal25 and should be limited to factual findings made by 
the district court. The courts should give deference to the executive branch for agency decisions 
and follow the legislature’s statutes that are clear and unambiguous. The prosecutor’s open-file 
policy is fundamentally an executive function and this Court should look at the district attorney 
who wrote it intended to give it that meaning. A court cannot force a prosecutor to adopt a policy 
he or she does not want.  
 Here, the prosecutorial policy overlaps with a criminal case. So the district court could 
sanction a prosecutor, exclude evidence from trial, or void a conviction if a prosecutor intentionally 
violated the policy.26 But a court cannot write or amend laws, regulations, or policies for other 
branches of the government.27  
 The dissent was also concerned whether the court possesses the power to interpret the 
meaning of an executive branch policy as a matter of law de novo. If interpretation of the policy 
                                                          
24  NEV. REV. STAT. 174.234, NEV. REV. STAT. 174.245, NEV. REV. STAT. 484C.400(2), NEV. REV. STAT. 
200.485(4), and NEV. REV. STAT. 207.016(2). 
25  Stone v. Wade, 105 Nev. 206, 209 n.3, 772 P.2d 1291, 1293 n.3 (1989). 
26  See McKee v. State, 112 Nev. 642, 648, 917 P.2d 940, 944 (1996) (when prosecutor represented that he would 
comply with open-file policy but didn’t, he committed “an act of deception” that misled the defendant and warranted 
reversal of criminal conviction.).  
27  See Holiday Ret. Corp v. State, Div. of Indus. Relations, 128 Nev.  150, 154, 274 P.3d 759, 761 (2012). 
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or statute is ambiguous then the court must assess the intent of the drafter. There is no publically 
available history or debate to analyze the intent of the drafter for the open-file policy so it is unclear 
if this Court has the power to interpret the policy. The dissent does not assume this Court had the 
power to engage in judicial construction of the prosecutor’s policy and even if the Court did, should 
give considerable deference to the district attorney rather than as a question de novo.  
 The open-file policy goes further than Brady or Giglio so if the district attorney decides its 
voluntary discovery policy should expire before sentencing, then the courts should do nothing if it 
does not violate existing law, the constitution, or intrude judicial functions. Here it did not. There 
was no Brady or Giglio violation. The majority gave no deference to the district attorney. 
Quisano’s sentence was not affected by the open-file policy. And nobody asserts that the policy is 
illegal, unconstitutional, or ambiguous.  
 Thus, the content and meaning of the prosecutor’s policy is none of the court’s business.  
